T1095: Non-Application Layer Protocol
Non-Application Layer Protocol (T1095) é uma técnica catalogada no MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise usada como referência para mapear comportamento adversário em auditorias de segurança.
Contexto para AppSec
Em uma auditoria de AppSec, Non-Application Layer Protocol deve ser usada para revisar caminhos em que código, configuração, dependências ou infraestrutura podem viabilizar o comportamento descrito pela MITRE. No ATT&CK, ela aparece em Command and Control. As plataformas mapeadas pela MITRE incluem ESXi, Linux, macOS, Network Devices e Windows. No Vigly, esse contexto ajuda a conectar evidências do repositório com priorização e remediação.
Descrição oficial original do MITRE ATT&CK
Adversaries may use an OSI non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive. Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL). ICMP communication between hosts is one example. Because ICMP is part of the Internet Protocol Suite, it is required to be implemented by all IP-compatible hosts. However, it is not as commonly monitored as other Internet Protocols such as TCP or UDP and may be used by adversaries to hide communications. In ESXi environments, adversaries may leverage the Virtual Machine Communication Interface (VMCI) for communication between guest virtual machines and the ESXi host. This traffic is similar to client-server communications on traditional network sockets but is localized to the physical machine running the ESXi host, meaning it does not traverse external networks (routers, switches). This results in communications that are invisible to external monitoring and standard networking tools like tcpdump, netstat, nmap, and Wireshark. By adding a VMCI backdoor to a compromised ESXi host, adversaries may persistently regain access from any guest VM to the compromised ESXi host’s backdoor, regardless of network segmentation or firewall rules in place.
Como o Vigly audita a técnica Non-Application Layer Protocol automaticamente na sua pipeline
O Vigly cruza sinais de SAST, modelagem de ameaças, regras de negócio e evidências do repositório para priorizar riscos reais antes que eles cheguem à produção.
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